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Petroleum Planning as State Building
in Timor-Leste
Judith Bovensiepen and Maj Nygaard-Christensen
This article examines the aesthetics and contestations surrounding the planning of a far-
reaching petroleum infrastructure and development scheme on the south coast of Timor-
Leste. The scheme, known as the Tasi Mane project, is symptomatic of the central role
that oil and gas revenues have come to play in the country’s development. The article
explores how promises of prosperity mobilise visions of societal improvement that
were once associated with independence and examines some of the social and
political effects that the anticipation of petroleum wealth and infrastructure
engenders. While the availability of revenues from oil and gas generate modernist
imaginaries of prosperity, the Tasi Mane project can itself be seen as a technology of
state building. This process is, however, fraught with contradictions, since a state’s
legitimacy and autonomy are dependent on recognition by others.
Keywords: Oil and gas; Resource Curse; Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction; Political
Authority; State Building; Sovereignty
Introduction
This article examines the interconnection between resource management, state build-
ing and sovereignty in Asia’s newest nation, Timor-Leste. It offers a case study of gov-
ernment plans to develop a large-scale, multi-million-dollar petroleum infrastructure
project along the south coast, known as the Tasi Mane project. The project has given
rise to two radically different appraisals: one that sets the project as the catalyst for a
grand, national-level development process, and another that highlights the project’s
Judith Bovensiepen is a senior lecturer in anthropology at the University of Kent, UK. Her current research
focuses on the politics and history of oil explorations in Timor-Leste. Correspondence to: Judith Bovensiepen,
School of Anthropology and Conservation, The University of Kent, Marlowe Building, Canterbury, Kent
CT27NR, UK. Email: J.M.Bovensiepen@kent.ac.uk
Maj Nygaard-Christensen is a researcher in the Department of Psychology and Behaviour Sciences at Aarhus
University, Denmark. She has carried out extensive research on development, UN intervention, and national poli-
tics in Timor-Leste.
The Asia Paciﬁc Journal of Anthropology, 2018
Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 412–431, https://doi.org/10.1080/14442213.2018.1513060
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
strong potential for failure. The project is envisioned by government leaders as a key
driving force of economic growth and development. By directing oil and gas resources
from the Timor Sea and elsewhere onshore to the Timorese south coast for processing,
the Tasi Mane project is said to create local employment opportunities, boost the
national economy, and develop the south coast which has largely been cut off from
international and national development projects. Domestic critics and external com-
mentators, however, predict its inevitable failure in economic, environmental and
development terms.
Rather than lining up with these narratives of either success or failure, this article
takes a cue from Weszkalny’s work (2014) on the effects brought on by the antici-
pation of oil. The article examines the expectations surrounding both the material
arrival of petroleum through the planned pipeline as well as the anticipated develop-
ment effects engendered by the aesthetic crafting of the Tasi Mane project. We will
show how these expectations and hopes themselves have concrete social and material
effects, even while the Tasi Mane project remains in suspension. More speciﬁcally, the
article argues that the planning of this large-scale petroleum infrastructure site and the
aesthetic framing of petroleum-fuelled high-modern development work to project and
to establish political authority and sovereignty in a context of purported state fragility.1
Petroleum resources located in the Timor Sea, where maritime borders between
Timor-Leste and Australia had been unsettled until March 2018, illustrate what
Bridge and Le Billon (2013) describe as a rapidly changing global geography of pet-
roleum extraction. For nearly half a century, petroleum extraction occurred in concen-
trated centres such as the Middle East. However, petroleum is increasingly extracted in
unconventional and highly disputed petroleum ﬁelds, typically in areas marked by
weak state structures and/or unsettled questions of ownership (2013, 13). In such
areas, the story of petroleum is summarised through the discourse of the ‘resource
curse’ and often forms part of a broader narrative of state failure. In Timor-Leste,
civil society groups as well as external analysts commenting on the Tasi Mane
project highlight the adverse effects of petroleum dependency, cite low oil prices,
express doubts about the quantity of Timor-Leste’s onshore and offshore resources,
and point to the environmental unsustainability of the project (e.g. Cryan 2015;
La’o Hamutuk 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Fundasaun Mahein 2013).
On the basis of such critiques, and with the Timorese government’s impressive
plans for a radically remade, urbanised, and industrialised south coastal landscape,
complete with grid-planned new cities, Scott’s (1998) notion of high-modernist,
state-planned development schemes offers a tempting reading. Such an approach
would foreground the project’s vulnerability to failure in economic or human devel-
opment terms and ultimately provide a study of failed state management. In this
manner, Meitzner Yoder (2015, 303) argued that the implementation of a special econ-
omic zone in Timor-Leste’s enclave of Oecusse, another recently initiated mega-
project, could lead to the erasure of Oecusse’s speciﬁcity as a place. Not disregarding
such views, nor the persuasive and legitimate warnings issued by civil society represen-
tatives, we wish however to take a somewhat different approach, with the aim of
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exploring some of the other effects of mega-project planning in independent Timor-
Leste. More speciﬁcally, we wish to turn the idea of state-driven development (and
failure) on its head, and instead suggest that the planning of the Tasi Mane project
is instrumental in the social production of the state itself.
Attending to the spectacle of petroleum planning in Timor-Leste, we thus propose
that the Tasi Mane project might be understood not so much as an instance of state-
planned development in Scott’s sense, but rather as a project aimed at manifesting and
producing statehood in a country that, according to popular complaints, has suffered
from the absence of functioning state institutions and which external accounts portray
through the discourse of state failure (Cotton 2007; contrast with Pereira 2014; RDTL
2014). Our argument thus reverberates with studies of how oil interacts with and pro-
duces particular political institutions, practices, and ideas in both destructive and ‘pol-
itically productive’ways (see also Barry 2013; Coronil 1997; Mitchell 2011; Weszkalnys
2011, 2014, 217, 2015).
Such work encourages a more open-ended approach than the resource curse litera-
ture’s focus on petroleum’s ultimately destructive qualities, allowing us to explore the
broader effects of petroleum planning in Timor-Leste. Following Mitchell (1991) who
emphasises both the ideal and material dimensions of the state, we argue that the gov-
ernment’s petro-visions form part of the ideological process of state building. More-
over, we show that as a ‘key technology of state building’ (Roll in press), the Tasi
Mane project lays bare the inherent contradictions of this process, exempliﬁed by
what Rutherford (2012) calls the ‘paradox of sovereignty’. Sovereignty, deﬁned as
‘supreme and absolute power’ (Rutherford 2012, 10), both drives and underpins
state building. Due to Timor-Leste’s newly achieved independent nationhood follow-
ing colonial rule, occupation, and UN administration, popular and political desires for
a self-relying and externally acknowledged sovereign nation are particularly urgent.
However, the desire for full autonomy at once implies an exemption from external
relations and depends on recognition by other nations, and thus remains an always
unobtainable ideal (Rutherford 2012, 4). This paradoxical dual desire for full sover-
eignty and external recognition, we suggest, lies at the heart of the Tasi Mane
project and political attempts to bring it to completion. The project is thus both
shaped by and co-producing of a ﬁeld of intense contestation where international
borders, resource ownership, and state capacity to successfully convert resources
into national wealth and development are all at stake.
We begin by situating the Tasi Mane project in the context of post-occupation state
building, illustrating how both proponents and critics of the project cement the idea of
the state as a uniﬁed institution. Subsequently, we tease out how the infrastructure
project planning exposes the tensions between attempts to assert national sovereignty
and the need to be acknowledged by a perceived ‘international community’. In the
third part, we analyse the visions and utopian hopes mobilised by state planners
through the aesthetic crafting of the Tasi Mane project. And ﬁnally, we examine the
material and social effects that the very planning of petroleum-infrastructure have,
even prior to the project’s actual realisation.
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Petroleum-Fuelled Development as a Technology of State building
Timor-Leste achieved independence in 2002 after a period of UN transitional admin-
istration that followed the country’s 1999 separation from Indonesia. Prior to Indone-
sia’s 1975 invasion and subsequent occupation, eastern Timor and the Oecusse enclave
were under Portuguese colonial administration.
The end of the Indonesian occupation initiated one of the most comprehensive
state-building processes to date. Between 1999 and 2002, this process was managed
by UNTAET, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, which
had the unique role of being the key driver of state building while simultaneously
acting as the state administration itself (Downie 2007, 29). Behind this background,
and with no previous independent state structures as references, UNTAET became
tasked with establishing a political system, formulating electoral processes and
holding national elections, setting up ﬁnancial systems, drafting foreign policies, estab-
lishing a civil service and training its staff, as well as training journalists, health
workers, teachers, lawyers, court ofﬁcials, police and political leaders (Downie 2007,
30). In the post-intervention years, the paradox of foreign-led establishment of state
institutions has continued to shape and challenge domestic political attempts to
produce state authority and uphold the idea of a sovereign state. As a result of rule
by three successive foreign entities, Timorese leadership is acutely sensitive to the
need to establish and strengthen domestic institutions.
Since 2006, state-building efforts have been primarily funded by international aid
and the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund, a sovereign wealth fund established in 2005
to contain the surplus of Timor-Leste’s oil and gas income. After initial plans to use
only the interest generated by the fund so that it would not exceed the Estimated Sus-
tainable Income level (ESI), plus non-oil revenues, the state budget became increas-
ingly dependent on petroleum fund revenues, particularly after 2012 (Nixon 2012,
150; La’o Hamutuk 2014, 2017).
In spite of continued calls to diversify the heavily petroleum-reliant economy, the
centrepiece of Timor-Leste’s National Strategic Development Plan for 2020 (RDTL
2011) is the ‘petroleum corridor’, which aims at bringing oil and gas from offshore
ﬁelds in the Timor Sea to Timor-Leste’s southern shores. In interviews, senior
ﬁgures in the Timor-Leste petroleum industry and Ministry for Petroleum and
Natural Resources (active in 2015–16) outlined that the Tasi Mane project is part of
the government’s key political strategy to secure a more stable and domestically
driven development process.
The Tasi Mane project is to spread over three clusters that span 160 km: Suai,
Betano and Beaço. It stipulates the building of a supply base, an airport, a port and
industrial estates in Suai; a liquiﬁed natural gas (LNG) plant in Beaço, where the pipe-
line from the Timor Sea will reach shore; another international airport, a reﬁnery and
petrochemical plant, as well as a petroleum industry administration city (Nova
Betano) in Betano (La’o Hamutuk 2013a; RDTL 2011). Several sources from the gov-
ernment and business community have argued that the idea to spread the petroleum
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industry over three clusters was a political decision, so that diverse regions would
beneﬁt from the development, and possibly to avoid creating ‘enclaves’ as commonly
occurs in oil-rich regions (Ferguson 2005). The project also involves building a multi-
lane highway to connect the different sites. Some of the residents along the highway
route and around the sites of the new facilities might be relocated to grid-planned
new cities. The Tasi Mane project thereby promises to open up an isolated and aban-
doned area to radical exposure to externally led development and investment.
Civil society critiques of the planned petroleum project have mirrored academic dis-
courses of the resource curse, which highlights the negative economic development
and political volatility endangered by oil dependence (Sachs and Warner 2001; cf.
Weszkalnys 2011). Civil society representatives have thus argued that the project is
holding back efforts to create a diversiﬁed and sustainable economy, may harm the
environment and may cause a rise in political corruption (La’o Hamutuk 2013b; Fun-
dasaun Mahein 2013; Scheiner 2014). Moreover, some political analysts have
suggested that Timor-Leste’s oil-producing ﬁelds will be empty by 2024 and that
resources from the Petroleum Fund will be exhausted by 2030 (La’o Hamutuk
2013a, 2015, 2018). Whilst the recently agreed Greater Sunrise resource sharing agree-
ment (Leach 2018) is likely to provide the Timor-Leste government with signiﬁcant
future revenue, this is unlikely to last more than a generation (La’o Hamutuk 2018).
Moreover, some observers express concern over ﬁnancial viability or how tenders
for the construction will be allocated, while others emphasise its potentially detrimen-
tal environmental impact (Fundasaun Mahein 2013), the patrimonialist and clientelist
networks that oil dependency fosters (Neves in press; Scambary 2015) and the possi-
bility of dispossession and impoverishment (Cryan 2015).
Rather than taking state existence for granted as a concrete entity, Abrams (1988)
in his critical essay ‘The Difﬁculty of Studying the State’ points to the processes
through which the idea of the state is promoted. The state, in this sense, is an ideo-
logical construct, since the idea that the state has a concrete existence is an illusion.
Mitchell (1991) developed this argument further to stress that the ideological pro-
cesses that produce the state involve not just ideal, but also material dimensions.
In continuation of this, we suggest that the Tasi Mane project works to cultivate
the projection of the idea of the state onto the political post-conﬂict landscape of
Timor-Leste. Even prior to being realised, the project contributes to the material
manifestation of the state, thereby producing concrete political and institutional
effects. The planning of grand development schemes like the Tasi Mane project
are particularly effective at this, since they are premised on the idea of an
already-existing uniﬁed political body capable of managing and converting the
nation’s resources into national development, thus concealing the very processes
through which the state is socially produced. This is not merely a top-down, govern-
ment-driven process. Rather, as we will see in the ﬁnal part of the article, this mani-
festation of the state is also produced through local enterprises and small-scale
business ventures initiated by citizens who align with and thus co-produce the gov-
ernment’s development vision of a remade south coast.
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In arguing that the Tasi Mane project is central to the ideological and material pro-
duction of the state, we draw on Kate Roll (in press), who has examined the generous
veteran pension scheme that has been implemented in Timor-Leste since 2002 and is
largely ﬁnanced from the Petroleum Fund. Roll argues that the veteran scheme is a
‘technology for state-building’, which ‘consolidate[s] power with the state, moving
from multiple sites of legitimate force and authority towards a Weberian monopoly,
while also continuing to draw upon the symbolic power of the resistance movement
and its leadership’ (Roll in press). The additional effort that needs to go into the ideo-
logical production of the state in a post-conﬂict situation such as Timor-Leste draws
attention to the constructed nature of the state, and to the inherent contradictions of
this process. The management of resource wealth has become a crucial dimension in
political leaders’ attempts to secure recognition and legitimacy, both domestically as
well as externally (see also, Meitzner Yoder, this special issue).
Sovereignty and Dependence
Rutherford (2012, 1) has stressed ‘the uneasy relationship between sovereignty and audi-
ence’, showing how in their quest for sovereignty, governments turn to one another for
recognition. In that way, sovereignty simultaneously implies mastery over others and
exemption from the constraints of social relations (Rutherford 2012, 4), yet is only
achieved through recognition from others and is thereby inherently relational (Rutherford
2012, 21). The historically unprecedented external contributions to Timor-Leste’s foun-
dation as an independent nation, in the form of UNTAET and subsequent donor contri-
butions, has exacerbated this ‘paradox of sovereignty’ (Rutherford 2012, 2012), and the
ambivalence with which Timorese leaders and constituents relate to neighbouring
countries and external inﬂuence over political processes.
Although countries such as Australia have acted as key donors for Timorese state
building, they have also been among the most critical of Timorese political develop-
ment and state management. Both the International Force for East Timor (INTER-
FET) that responded to violence conducted by Indonesian forces and pro-Indonesia
militia groups in 1999, and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) put in place
to curb civilian violence in 2006, were under Australian military command. After
initially being welcomed in Timor-Leste, the Australian presence was increasingly
seen as politically biased and subjected to critiques that conjured up the familiar
trope of occupation. Gradually, and particularly after the 2006–07 political crisis, criti-
cism grew in Timor-Leste against what came increasingly to be viewed as international
interference in domestic political affairs. In this context, critics like Neves have argued
that donor spending undermined state sovereignty by creating new forms of depen-
dence on foreign donors and limiting full Timorese participation in the nation-build-
ing process (Neves 2006, 18).
In November 2014, several Portuguese legal advisors were expelled from Timor-
Leste. There were suggestions that this was related to their ruling in favour of the
energy company ConocoPhillips, which the Timor-Leste government claimed owed
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additional taxes (e.g. Paul 2014). This expulsion raised concerns amongst the ‘inter-
national community’ that the ‘rule of law’ was under threat. Because of the relational
nature of sovereignty, acts to assert sovereignty (by expelling legal advisors) ended up
reproducing the discourse around ‘weak’ democratic institutions.
The Tasi Mane project should be understood in the context of this complex history
of foreign involvement. Key to the project is the plan to bring LNG from Greater
Sunrise oil and gas ﬁelds onshore, to the Timorese south coast, in an LNG plant to
be built in Beaço. According to the median line principle, Greater Sunrise oil and
gas ﬁelds—valued at several billion US dollars—would belong mostly to Timor-
Leste. However, at the time the Tasi Mane project was initiated, Australia was refusing
to negotiate a permanent maritime boundary between both countries. After Timor-
Leste regained independence, Australia had focussed on a resource sharing agreement,
CMATS (‘Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea’) that would provide
Timor-Leste merely with 50 per cent of the revenues from Greater Sunrise. The
agreed settlement was challenged when espionage accusations emerged in 2013. Aus-
tralian Security Intelligence Organisation agents, posing as aid workers, had bugged
the Timor-Leste government ofﬁces while doing renovations. The Australian govern-
ment had thus secured itself an unfair economic advantage in negotiations with
Timor-Leste (see Bovensiepen 2016). When this news emerged, the East Timorese
government took the Australian government to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague to challenge the treaty. In short, although Australia has acted as a key
donor to the Timorese development process, its external involvement has often
been understood as simultaneously undermining of national sovereignty.
In December 2013, demonstrations occurred outside the Australian embassy in
Dili in reaction to what is broadly regarded in Timor-Leste as illegitimate Australian
claims to oil and gas in the Timor Sea, which go back to the time of Indonesian
occupation (Aditjondro 1994; McGrath 2017). Around the time of the protests, graf-
ﬁti and stencil images appeared on the wall adjoining the Australian embassy in Dili,
positioned along the main road that connects the airport with the city centre. One
stencil pictured a kangaroo holding a black bag on which the word ‘OIL’ was printed
(see Figure 1). Another showed two crocodiles pointing spears at a pair of kangar-
oos, and behind the crocodiles an oil drum seeping blood (see Figure 2). Alongside
the stencils, a text written in Tetum read, ‘Our blood runs from the mountains to
the sea’. Referencing the sea, the text paralleled Timor-Leste’s struggle with Australia
over ownership of Timor Sea oil with the struggle for independence from Indonesia,
largely waged from the mountainous interior and positioned the country’s claim
over national resources within a broader history of struggle against foreign occupiers
and neo-colonialism. Some read it further as a reference to WWII, when Portuguese
Timor became a battleground between Japanese and Australian soldiers, of which
the latter beneﬁtted from the aid of Timorese helpers. This historical relationship
with Australia demonstrates how current negotiations over resource ownership
form part of a long and complex history of both conﬂict and cooperation with
foreign powers.
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In February 2016 another series of protests against Australia’s ‘occupation’ of the
Timor Sea took place in Dili, part of a broader campaign to settle Timor-Leste’s
southern boundary and to force Australia back to the negotiating table. Protests
were not limited to the streets of Dili, but were also waged on social media. Accord-
ing to political leaders behind the Tasi Mane project, the idea for an onshore pet-
roleum industry has roots in the resistance against Indonesia and is likewise
envisioned as part of a general national strategy to secure full sovereignty over
the country’s borders and over Greater Sunrise oil and gas resources (see also
Bovensiepen, in press).
In March 2018, after considerable national and international pressure, the Timor-
Leste government achieved a groundbreaking agreement that settles the maritime
boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia along the median line, which means
that most of Greater Sunrise oil and gas ﬁelds legally belong to Timor-Leste.
Beyond clarifying oil ﬁeld ownership and resource sharing, of central concern is
where processing will take place: in the sea on a ﬂoating platform, onshore in
Timor-Leste with facilities yet to be built (as envisaged in the Tasi Mane project
plans), or onshore in Australia with existing facilities in Darwin. At the time of
writing, questions around the location of processing LNG from the Greater Sunrise
ﬁelds in the Timor Sea have not been settled.
Figure 1 Political Grafﬁti in Dili.
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Initially, Woodside Petroleum had planned to process the resources from the
Greater Sunrise oilﬁelds via a ﬂoating platform. However, political leaders in
Timor-Leste insisted on a pipeline that would bring oil and gas onshore for processing.
These plans are understood within the historical context of the resistance struggle, as
illustrated by the suggestion made by a member of Timor-Leste’s oil industry in an
interview that ‘what we fought for is to own and manage our own oil’. Such claims
effectively frame the struggle for oil as part of a longer struggle for full political sover-
eignty. The repeated humiliations by the Australian government only increased this
desire, as the onshore petroleum infrastructure promises to produce visible signs of
sovereignty (Bovensiepen in press).
Against this background, the Tasi Mane project can thus be understood as a nation-
alist project that appeals to popular desires for a strong state capable of managing the
nation independent of foreign powers. Government plans to bring petroleum onshore
and build an independently managed petroleum industry—not offshore on faraway oil
platforms in the sea, but onshore for everyone to see—showcases state potency and
links up with popular ideas about what a truly independent and sovereign nation
might look like.
However, such attempts to distance Timor-Leste from foreign dependence are not
clear-cut. They occur alongside a preoccupation with international recognition. The
Figure 2 Political Grafﬁti in Dili.
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country’s ﬁrst appearance on the Failed States Index in 2007 led to growing domestic
concerns about the country’s international standing and has caused much disagree-
ment amongst politicians. For example, Agio Pereira (2014), the former Minister of
State and of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste has forcefully
argued against the notion of Timorese state failure. Against this prognosis he cites
Timor-Leste’s oil wealth and the Tasi Mane project, which are held up as evidence
of ongoing processes of nation building. Such responses from members of the
Timor-Leste government illustrate that external descriptions of Timor-Leste as
‘failed’ do not go unnoticed; instead, they are seen in the context of continued external
interference in Timorese politics that questions the Timorese state’s capacity for self-
governance and thus undermines full independence. Hence, broader questions of
sovereignty and self-rule are at stake in these contrasting scenarios of Timor-Leste’s
future—cast either as a weak, oil-dependent country or a resource-rich nation.
By March 2015, all of the striking political grafﬁti that covered Dili’s walls had been
covered with white paint, supposedly in anticipation of an international conference.
The covering over of political grafﬁti, similar to the discourses about political legiti-
macy and state authority, are made with constant reference to ‘an imagined inter-
national audience’ (Rutherford 2003, 13). In Timor-Leste, this sense of an
‘authorizing foreign gaze’ (Spyer 2008, 31) that acts as witness to the unfolding of
domestic political events (Strassler 2004, 705) has transformed understandings of pol-
itical legitimacy and authority. Particularly, it has led to a preoccupation with the
international standing and foreign connections of political leaders, so that inter-
national recognition in itself has come to work as a form of legitimisation of political
leadership (Bovensiepen 2014; Nygaard-Christensen 2012).
The management of oil wealth is similarly entangled with the production and asser-
tion of political authority, and illustrates the tensions inherent in the idea and practice
of sovereignty pointed to by Rutherford (2012). Reminiscent of Gupta’s (1995) argu-
ment on how discourses on corruption allow people to imagine the state, government
visions of the Tasi Mane project as well as civil society critiques of the project contrib-
ute to this ideological formation of the state. Drawing on the history of the resistance,
while at the same time needing to go beyond this history to legitimise itself, the state
not only needs to be recognised by Timor-Leste’s citizens, but is also constrained by its
ambivalent foreign relations.
Aesthetic Crafting of the Future
During the 2012 elections, the government distributed brochures containing descrip-
tions of the planned Tasi Mane project, images of computer-generated plans for con-
struction, and photographs of PrimeMinister Xanana Gusmão in a close embrace with
‘ordinary folks’. The ideas of modernity promoted by the government through the dis-
tribution of plans for ‘new cities’ and industrialised areas on the south coast resonated
with popular ideas of subterranean wealth as a potential source of radical societal
transformation and future prosperity. Indeed, since its founding, CNRT ofﬁcials
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have appealed to voters through the production of what Kammen (2009) has called
‘utopian visions’.
The 2007 launch of Gusmão’s CNRT party, just in time to allow it to compete in that
year’s parliamentary elections, was followed by the display of similar imagery of campaign
banners that decorated Dili’s streets. The election posters pictured high modern skyscra-
pers, shopping malls, and airports on banners that were easily mistaken for architectural
renderings of planned buildings and striking in their contrast to the actual poverty-
stricken appearance of Dili. Likewise, brochures and images of the Tasi Mane project
are remarkable in their contrast to the south coast, which has been disconnected from
most development projects that have instead focussed on more easily accessible areas.
Yet merely belittling or disregarding such visions of future prosperity undermines
both their relation to popular desires for a radically improved society and their con-
nection to concrete practices (see also Bovensiepen 2016; Kammen 2009; Nygaard-
Christensen 2010; Weszkalnys 2014). Writing about capitalism, Mulgan (2013, 114)
notes how ‘the very extremism of possible worlds’ conjured up by utopian scenarios
‘feeds back usefully into the more prosaic and incremental world of everyday practice’.
Indeed, the ideas set in motion by the prospect of oil wealth, and by visions of Timor-
Leste as the next Dubai or Singapore, have shaped citizens’ everyday lives and affected
the management of domestic, national and global resources.
While CNRT ofﬁcials initially referred to the 2007 campaign banners as ‘just
dreams’ or ‘visions’ of what Timor-Leste might look like, they soon came to be
replaced by actual building plans on fenced-off building sites in the capital once the
new government alliance with CNRT at its centre had commenced. In the following
years, Dili became the site of a building boom with hotels, a post ofﬁce, grand govern-
ment buildings, and a new presidential palace. While the UN and Australia had a
central role in the democratisation and state-building process of the early years of
independence, the building boom that followed was achieved with the support of
Asian donors (mainly China) and the proliferation of new business alliances and con-
tracts with Indonesian and Chinese investors: building plans in front of the new post
ofﬁce showed a Korean ﬂag next to the ﬂag of Timor-Leste; China was contracted to
build a large presidential palace and the highway that will connect the different clusters
of the Tasi Mane project (see Figure 3.); and an Indonesian company was contracted to
build the new, tall Ministry of Finance.
The building boom taking place since 2007 has been enabled by funds from Timor-
Leste’s petroleum fund, which also funded other beneﬁts for the local population,
including health clinics and hospitals, new schools, near universal electricity services
and telecommunications, and an array of social transfers and pensions. The material
reconstruction of the capital appears to model the city along the lines of new Asian
market economies in the region through the building of white, often multi-story con-
crete-structured housing, new shopping malls, hotels, and political ofﬁces. These pro-
jections of what Timor-Leste might look like and practical attempts to realise them in
the post-occupation years are not only oriented towards the future, but have roots in
resistance imaginaries of independence.
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No broad and sustained debates about independent nationhood took place during
the occupation years, despite continued resistance against Indonesian rule (see Bexley
and Tchailoro 2013; Moxham 2008, 7). Instead, such negotiations were actively sup-
pressed and postponed until after independence due to the need for a united resistance
movement (Bexley and Tchailoro 2013). As a result, independence came to be ima-
gined more vaguely as a form of ‘anti-past’ (Gluck 2003)—an inversion of everything
wrong during the Indonesian regime, from violence to poverty (Nygaard-Christensen
2010, 68). Both political and popular discourses about Timorese nationalism came to
be premised on the idea of radical transition to a better society. Imaginaries of inde-
pendence during the resistance were those of a prosperous nation where ‘everyone
would live in a “white” (i.e. modern) house in the cities’ (Kammen 2009, 391) or a
‘return’ to an idealised ancestral past free from foreign control or inﬂuence. Similarly,
Traube documents the popular understanding that independent nationhood ‘would
usher in a general utopian transformation’ (2007, 18). The more precise contours of
Figure 3 Highway Construction.
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what a Timorese nation might look like hence only began to be sketched out after
independence.
Initially, the idea of a new utopian order was supported by the ‘spectacle of inter-
vention’ (Nygaard-Christensen 2010) that occurred with the arrival of the UN and
the accompanying intervention industry. ‘We thought, with all of that equipment,
they can really help us here; things will get better’, a friend and research participant
recalled of the 1999 arrival of peacekeeping troops and the UN mission. During the
transition years, today recollected as a time of excitement, optimism, and high expec-
tations, international aid organisations and the Timorese elite collaborated in the
making of what they hoped would be a miracle nation or success story in terms of
internationally steered nation- and state-building processes (see Leach 2017, for a
history of nation-building). The onset of a domestic political crisis in 2006 effectively
crushed such expectations. Critically, the crisis led to widespread disillusionment
coined by a deep mistrust of the political leadership. Several political leaders were
accused of instigating or being unable to contain civilian violence during the crisis.
Against this background of collapsed utopias, state building only truly began in the
post-2006 years, when political leaders could no longer exclusively rely on the heritage
of the resistance as a source of legitimacy and state authority.
The expectations about future oil-generated wealth do not only have concrete effects
on current resource management but play on familiar hopes about rapid societal trans-
formations once associated with independence. The spectacular images of a future
Timor-Leste circulated by CNRT and the current government’s plans for the develop-
ment of the Tasi Mane project respond to these visions of sovereignty and give con-
crete form to how they might be achieved. A recurring theme in East Timorese
political imagery, illustrated particularly by the CNRT election campaign posters, is
the association between freedom and nationalism with a particular, arguably Indone-
sian-inspired vision of modernity (Nygaard-Christensen 2013). The project of nation
building has become ﬁrmly identiﬁed with a particular vision of modernity, with new
consumer practices at its centre. A similar logic is at the heart of the Tasi Mane project
(and the Oecusse special economic zone), which conjures up a vision of the future that
is not only modernist, but where freedom is equated with the ability to buy and
consume products associated with modernity. Issues of equality and sustainability,
however, seem to be less signiﬁcant in the vision of the future that oil wealth is
hoped to bring.
The Timor-Leste government gains some of its legitimacy by promoting the idea of
the state as guarding the nation’s natural resources against foreign powers, as well as
by fulﬁlling the ‘utopian promise’ of independent nationhood (see Gupta 2007, 271).
This is reminiscent of Coronil’s (1997, 4) observation that in its making as an oil
nation, Venezuela
was seen as having two bodies, a political body made up of its citizens and a natural
body made up of its rich subsoil. By condensing within itself the multiple powers
dispersed throughout the nation’s two bodies, the state appeared as a single agent
endowed with the magical power to remake the nation.
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Similarly, through the Tasi Mane project, East Timorese political leaders advocate an
idea of the state capable of transforming the nation via the management of natural
resources.
The aesthetic framing of the project has been rife with high-modernist images and
computer-generated videos that circulated around the country and on social media
(see, for example, Figure 4), and through political speeches given at community con-
sultations, during which promises of employment, raised living standards and
resource independence are made. For example, residents in Betano, where the oil reﬁn-
ery is to be built, were told during a meeting with government and oil industry repre-
sentatives that once the Tasi Mane project is completed, they would no longer need to
buy any petrol for their cars and motorbikes, since the reﬁnery would cater to their
needs. Once Timor-Leste had its own oil reﬁnery, the argument continued, petrol
would no longer need to be bought from other countries—Timor-Leste would be
truly resource independent.
The imagery produced of the planned project sites (see Figure 4)—alongside
CNRT’s political imagery and the explosion of street advertisements of foreign and
new domestic products following Dili’s recent building boom—give visual shape to
this remaking by casting the nation as a ‘market’ (see also Foster 1999, 274) about
Figure 4 Suai Airport Construction Plans.
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to open up to its citizens. By modelling this projected market along the lines of new
Asian market economies—both in its visual form and through concrete business alli-
ances and relations—the project at once asserts sovereignty in relation to Australia and
promises to open the nation up to another region associated with modernity, growth
and consumerism. The anticipatory effects promoted by this aesthetic framing of the
Tasi Mane project have contributed to the production of a vision of a modern, urba-
nised landscape and radically improved livelihoods, even before any state-led con-
struction occurred. As we will see in the remainder of the article, the way in which
this imaginary has been seized and appropriated by local citizens who have taken
steps to prepare for petroleum’s arrival, has had its own tangible social and material
effects on the Timorese south coast.
Social and Material Effects of Petroleum Planning
Suai is the only site where the Tasi Mane project has thus far seen any concrete building
work in the form of the airport expansion and highway construction (see Figure 3).
However, negotiations with Australia, failure to attract signiﬁcant foreign investment,
the rejection of the Hyundai Suai Supply Base contract by the Timorese Audit
Chamber (La’o Hamutuk 2013b), and political stalemate following the 2017 national
elections, meant that the implementation of the Tasi Mane project has made slow pro-
gress. Neither supply base, oil reﬁnery, nor LNG plant have been constructed to date.
Even though the project envisioned by the government remains ‘suspended’ or
‘paused’ (Weszkalnys 2015, 615), its anticipation has had transformative effects on the
south coast, where it has offset a range of activities among citizens in preparation for pet-
roleum’s expected arrival.
In both Suai (in 2015 and in 2017) and Betano (in 2016), a number of subsistence
farmers had ceased working on their ﬁelds, because their land has been identiﬁed as a
target for the Tasi Mane project (supply base and oil reﬁnery). In Betano, some of the
houses along the beach where the oil reﬁnery is to be built have been abandoned and
residents have moved to more remote areas. The identiﬁcation of land to be ‘liberated’
for the Tasi Mane project and the compensation payments have produced several
intra- and inter-communal conﬂicts in both Betano and Suai. A stated aim of the Min-
istry for Petroleum and Natural Resources is to invest in human development, along
with the goals of ‘maximum participation’, ‘maximum beneﬁts’, and ‘diversiﬁcation’.
To achieve these aims, ﬁfty students have been sent abroad to obtain university
degrees in oil- and gas-related subjects. Farmers living in the Suai area, where the
supply base will be built, received English, computer and driving classes so that in
the future, they will be able to take on jobs working for employees of the petroleum
industry. The spectacle of petroleum-fuelled development plans has thereby caused
local communities to ready themselves for the anticipated economic spillover beneﬁts
of the project. This seems reminiscent of how people in Dili actively pursued ‘skills’
such as English and computer literacy that would match those sought after by inter-
national organisations in the years following separation from Indonesia.
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In Suai, where land compensation had largely been paid by 2017, gambling parlours
opened and motor-cross racing was put up. The area has also witnessed a spike in indi-
viduals—some residing as far away as Dili—purchasing land or property with the aim
of renting out houses to expected incoming petroleum investors and employees. The
project has thus sparked hopes for a rental market mirroring that of Dili in the post-
intervention years, where many families supported their incomes by renting out rooms
or houses to foreign ofﬁcials and NGO workers. In 2013, a group of highly motivated
East Timorese graduates founded an organisation called EIPA (Extractive Industries
Professional Association), aimed at supporting East Timorese men and women to
get employment in the natural resource sector. In 2016, the large majority of the
320 members (mostly engineers, and men) had not yet found work—even though
their families had gone to great expense to support their studies, mostly in Indonesia.
The anticipation of the expansion of the energy sector in Timor-Leste has clearly
shaped the life choices of these graduates.
Given the immense power of the visions mobilised and Tasi Mane project’s framing
as a struggle to secure state sovereignty, local residents have offered comparatively little
protest and even their enthusiasm thus far is unsurprising.2 Ordinary citizens have
initiated a range of small-scale entrepreneurial efforts ordered around the expected pet-
roleum infrastructure and its imagined beneﬁts, thus aligning themselves with the devel-
opment vision promoted by the government. This resonates with Morten Nielsen’s
(2011, 332) concept of ‘inverse governmentality’, which he coined to describe how gov-
ernance is not just exerted top-down from state to people, but how citizens themselves
actively create the governmental techniques by which they are governed (2011, 347).
Analysing illegal house-building projects in the outskirts of Maputo, he shows how resi-
dents mimic state-deﬁned ‘urban standards that the state could have applied (but which
it did not)’. By doing so, they ‘create the ordering gaze of power by which they ought to
be illuminated. The gaze radiates, as it were, back from its object towards its source
which is thus supplied both with properties and form’ (Nielsen 2011, 332). Similarly,
Timorese citizens who are preparing themselves through concrete steps for the Tasi
Mane project can be seen to have played a crucial part in the co-production of the gov-
ernment’s development vision, and thus, in the projection of the idea of a strong state
capable of bringing it to completion, even as the project itself remains unﬁnished.
* * *
By projecting a vision of a future where government-led development schemes
bring prosperity to everyone, political actors have succeeded in producing an image
of the sovereign East Timorese state that administers the nation’s oil wealth. By
sharing in—and often co-producing—these visions, citizens implicitly recognise the
legitimacy of the state and thus contribute to generating political authority (cf.
Harvey and Knox 2015). The Tasi Mane project hence embodies the ideal and material
processes through which the state is made. However, tied to the modernist vision of
state building, the infrastructure project is not only socially and politically productive,
but is also subject to the vulnerabilities and contradictions that sovereignty implies. It
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must be understood in the context of the country’s contemporary political landscape,
its speciﬁc historical experience and the paradox of dependency on recognition by a
foreign gaze that both authorises and potentially threatens state sovereignty.
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Notes
[1] Both authors are social anthropologists who have carried out ﬁeldwork in Timor-Leste since
2005. This paper is informed by their past and current research and builds on interviews
with state ofﬁcials and civil society representatives, participant observation, and media analysis,
among other sources.
[2] There have been some protests against the power plant in Betano (see Naidu this special issue)
and against the lack of employment of local workers at the Suai airport.
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